ON TACTICS AGAINST JAPANESE IMPERIALISM
December 27, 1935
[This report was given by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the conference of Party activists which was held at Wayaopao, northern Shensi, after the Wayaopao meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in December 1935. This meeting, one of the most important ever called by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, criticized the mistaken view in the Party that the Chinese national bourgeoisie could not be an ally of the workers and peasants in the common fight against Japan, and it decided on the tactics of a national united front. On the basis of the Political Bureau’s decisions, Comrade Mao Tse-tung explained in detail the possibility and the importance of re-establishing a united front with the national bourgeoisie on the condition that there must be resistance to Japan. He stressed the decisive significance of the leading role to be played by the Communist Party and the Red Army in this united front. He pointed out the protracted character of the Chinese revolution, and criticized the narrow-minded closed-doorism and overhastiness with regard to the revolution which had long existed in the Party and which were the basic cause of the serious setbacks of the Party and the Red Army during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. At the same time, he called the Party’s attention to the historical lesson of the defeat of the revolution in 1927 which had been caused by Chen Tu-hsiu’s Right opportunism, and he showed that Chiang Kai-shek would inevitably try to undermine the forces of the revolution. Thus he enabled the Party to remain clear-headed in the new situation and to save the forces of the revolution from losses, in spite of Chiang Kai-shek’s endless intrigues and many armed attacks. In January 1935, at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee which was convened in Tsunyi, Kweichow Province, a new Central Committee leadership headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung had been established in place of the former “Left” opportunist leadership. However, as that meeting took place during the Red Army’s Long March, it had to confine itself to decisions on the most urgent military problems and on the organization of the Secretariat and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee. Only when the Red Army had reached northern Shensi after the Long March was it possible for the Central Committee of the Party to deal systematically with the various problems of tactics in the political sphere. A most comprehensive analysis of these problems is given in this report by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.]
Comrades! A great change has now taken place in the political situation. Our Party has defined its tasks in the light of this changed situation.
What is the present situation?
Its main characteristic is that Japanese imperialism wants to turn China into a colony.
As we all know, for nearly a hundred years China has been a semi-colonial country jointly dominated by several imperialist powers. Owing to the Chinese people’s struggle against imperialism and to conflicts among the imperialist powers, China has been able to retain a semi-independent status. For a time World War I gave Japanese imperialism the opportunity of dominating China exclusively. But the treaty surrendering China to Japan, the Twenty-one Demands  signed by Yuan Shih-kai,  the arch-traitor of that time, was inevitably rendered null and void as a result of the Chinese people’s fight against Japanese imperialism and of the intervention by other imperialist powers. In 1922 at the Washington Nine-Power Conference called by the United States. A treaty  was signed which once again placed China under the joint domination of several imperialist powers. But before long the situation changed again. The Incident of September 18, 1931,  began the present stage of Japan’s colonization of China. As Japanese aggression was temporarily limited to the four northeastern provinces,  some people felt that the Japanese imperialists would probably advance no farther. Today things are different. The Japanese imperialists have already shown their intention of penetrating south of the Great Wall and occupying all China. Now they want to convert the whole of China from a semi-colony shared by several imperialist powers into a colony monopolized by Japan. The recent Eastern Hopei Incident  and diplomatic talks are clear indications of this trend of events which threatens the survival of the whole Chinese people. This faces all classes and political groups in China with the question of what to do. Resist? Surrender? Or vacillate between the two?
Now let us see how the different classes in China answer this question.
The workers and the peasants are all demanding resistance. The revolution of 1924-27, the agrarian revolution from 1927 to the present day, and the anti-Japanese tide since the Incident of September 18, 1931, have all proved that the working class and peasantry are the most resolute forces in the Chinese revolution.
The petty bourgeoisie is also demanding resistance. Have not the student youth and the urban petty bourgeoisie already started a broad anti-Japanese movement? This section of the Chinese petty bourgeoisie took part in the revolution of 1924-27. Like the peasants, they are small producers in their economic status, and their interests are irreconcilable with those of imperialism. Imperialism and the Chinese counter-revolutionary forces have done them great harm, driving many into unemployment, bankruptcy or semi-bankruptcy. Now, faced with the immediate danger of becoming slaves to a foreign nation, they have no alternative but to resist.
But how do the national bourgeoisie, the comprador and landlord classes, and the Kuomintang face up to this question?
The big local tyrants and evil gentry, the big warlords and the big bureaucrats and compradors have long made up their minds. They maintain, as they have done all along, that revolution of whatever kind is worse than imperialism. They have formed a camp of traitors, for whom the question of whether to become slaves of a foreign nation simply does not exist because they have already lost all sense of nationality and their interests are inseparably linked with imperialism. Their chieftain is Chiang Kai-shek. This camp of traitors are deadly enemies of the Chinese people. Japanese imperialism could not have become so blatant in its aggression were it not for this pack of traitors. They are the running dogs of imperialism.
The national bourgeoisie presents a complicated problem. This class took part in the revolution of 1924-27, but terrified by the flames of revolution, it later deserted to the enemy of the people, the Chiang Kai-shek clique. The question is whether there is any possibility that this class will undergo a change in the present circumstances. We think there is. For the national bourgeoisie is not the same as either the landlord or the comprador class; there is a difference between them. The national bourgeoisie is less feudal than the landlord class and not so comprador as the comprador class. The section having more ties with foreign capital and the Chinese landed interests form the right-wing of the national bourgeoisie; and we shall not, for the moment, consider whether it can change or not. The problem lies with those sections which have few or no such ties. We believe that in the new situation in which China is threatened with being reduced to a colony these sections may change their attitude. The change will be marked by vacillation. On the one hand they dislike imperialism, and on the other they fear thorough revolution, and they vacillate between the two. This explains why they took part in the revolution of 1924-27 and why, in the end, they went over to Chiang Kai-shek’s side. In what respect does the present period differ from 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution? China was then still a semi-colony, but now she is on the way to becoming a colony. Over the past nine years the national bourgeoisie has deserted its ally, the working class, and made friends with the landlord and comprador classes, but has it gained anything? Nothing, except the bankruptcy or semi-bankruptcy of its industrial and commercial enterprises. Hence we believe that in the present situation the attitude of the national bourgeoisie can change. What will be the extent of the change? The general characteristic of the national bourgeoisie is to vacillate. But at a certain stage of the struggle, one section (the left-wing) may join in, while another section may vacillate towards neutrality.
Whose class interests does the 19th Route Army led by Tsai Ting-kai  and others represent? Those of the national bourgeoisie, the upper petty bourgeoisie, and the rich peasants and small landlords in the countryside. Did not Tsai Ting-kai and his associates once fight bitterly against the Red Army? Yes, but they subsequently concluded an anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang alliance with the Red Army. In Kiangsi they had attacked the Red Army, but later in Shanghai they fought the Japanese imperialists; later still, in Fukien they came to terms with the Red Army and turned their guns against Chiang Kai-shek. Whatever course Tsai Ting-kai and his associates may take in the future, and despite their Fukien People’s Government’s adherence to old practice in failing to arouse the people to struggle, it must be considered beneficial to the revolution that they turned their guns, originally trained on the Red Army, against Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek. It marked a split within the Kuomintang camp. If the circumstances following the September 18th Incident could cause this group to split away, why cannot the present circumstances give rise to other splits in the Kuomintang? Those Party members who hold that the whole landlord and bourgeois camp is united and permanent and will not change under any circumstances are wrong. They not only fail to appreciate the present grave situation, they have even forgotten history.
Let me speak a little more about the past. In 1926 and 1927, during the time when the revolutionary army advanced on Wuhan, captured it and marched into Honan, Tang Sheng-chih and Feng Yu-hsiang  took part in the revolution. In 1933, Feng Yu-hsiang co-operated for a time with the Communist Party in forming the Anti-Japanese Allied Army in Chahar Province.
Take another striking example. Did not the 26th Route Army, which, together with the 19th Route Army, had attacked the Red Army in Kiangsi, stage the Ningtu Uprising  in December 1931 and become part of the Red Army? The leaders of the Ningtu Uprising, Chao Po-sheng, Tung Chen-tang and others, have become steadfast comrades in the revolution.
The anti-Japanese operations of Ma Chan-shan  in the three northeastern provinces represented another split in the ruling class camp.
All these instances indicate that splits will occur in the enemy camp when all China comes within the range of Japanese bombs, and when the struggle changes its normal pace and suddenly surges forward.
Now, comrades, let us turn to another aspect of the question.
Is it correct to object to our view on the ground that China’s national bourgeoisie is politically and economically flabby, and to argue that it cannot possibly change its attitude in spite of the new circumstances? I think not. If weakness is the reason for its inability to change its attitude, why did the national bourgeoisie behave differently in 1924-27 when it did not merely vacillate towards the revolution but actually joined it? Can one say that the weakness of the national bourgeoisie is a new disease, and not one that accompanies it from the very womb? Can one say that the national bourgeoisie is weak today, but was not weak in 1924-27? One of the chief political and economic characteristics of a semi-colonial country is the weakness of its national bourgeoisie. That is exactly why the imperialists dare to bully them, and it follows that one of their characteristics is dislike of imperialism. Of course, so far from denying it, we fully recognize that it is the very weakness of the national bourgeoisie that may make it easy for the imperialists, landlords and compradors to entice them with the bait of some temporary advantage; hence their lack of revolutionary thoroughness. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that in the present circumstances there is no difference between the national bourgeoisie and the landlord and comprador classes.
Therefore, we emphatically assert that when the national crisis reaches a crucial point, splits will occur in the Kuomintang camp. Such splits have revealed themselves in the vacillation of the national bourgeoisie and the emergence of such anti-Japanese figures as Feng Yu-hsiang, Tsai Ting-kai and Ma Chan-shan, who have become popular for a time. Basically, these splits are unfavourable to the counterrevolution and favourable to the revolution. Their possibility is increased by China’s uneven political and economic development, and the consequent uneven development of the revolution.
Comrades, so much for the positive side of the question. Now let me take up the negative side, namely, the fact that certain elements among the national bourgeoisie are often past masters at deceiving the people. Why? Because apart from the genuine supporters of the people’s revolutionary cause, this class includes many who temporarily appear as revolutionaries or semi-revolutionaries, and who thus acquire a deceptive status which makes it difficult for the people to see through their lack of revolutionary thoroughness and their false trappings. This increases the responsibility devolving on the Communist Party to criticize its allies, unmask the fake revolutionaries, and gain the leadership. To deny the possibility that the national bourgeoisie may vacillate and join the revolution during great upheavals amounts to abandoning, or at any rate to minimizing, our Party’s task of contending for leadership. For if the national bourgeoisie were exactly the same as the landlords and compradors and had the same vile and traitorous visage, there would be little or no problem of contending with it for leadership.
In making a general analysis of the attitude of the Chinese landlord class and the bourgeoisie in times of great upheaval, we should also point to another aspect, namely, that even the landlord and comprador camp is not completely united. The reason is that China is a semicolonial country for which many imperialist powers are contending. When the struggle is directed against Japanese imperialism, then the running dogs of the United States or Britain, obeying the varying tones of their masters’ commands, may engage in veiled or even open strife with the Japanese imperialists and their running dogs. There have been many instances of such dog-fights and we shall not dwell on them. We will only mention the fact that Hu Han-min  a Kuomintang politician once detained by Chiang Kai-shek, has recently added his signature to the Six-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation  which we have advanced. The warlords of the Kwangtung and Kwangsi cliques  who back Hu Han-min are also opposing Chiang Kai-shek, under the deceitful slogans of “Recover our lost territory”, and “Resist Japan and at the same time suppress the bandits” (as against Chiang Kai-shek’s slogan of “First suppress the bandits, then resist Japan”). Is this not rather strange? No, it is not strange at all, but merely a particularly interesting example of a fight between large and small dogs, between well-fed and ill-fed dogs. It is not a big rift, but neither is it small; it is at once an irritating and painful contradiction. But such fights, such rifts, such contradictions are of use to the revolutionary people. We must turn to good account all such fights, rifts and contradictions in the enemy camp and turn them against our present main enemy.
Summing up the question of class relations, we may say that the basic change in the situation, namely, the Japanese invasion of China south of the Great Wall, has changed the relationship among the various classes in China, strengthening the camp of national revolution and weakening that of counter-revolution.
Now let us discuss the situation in the camp of China’s national revolution.
First, the Red Army. As you know, comrades, for almost a year and a half the three main contingents of the Chinese Red Army have carried out great shifts of position. The Sixth Army Group led by Jen Pi-shih  and other comrades began to shift to Comrade Ho Lung’s area  in August last year, and in October we ourselves started to shift position. In March this year the Red Army in the Szechuan-Shensi border area  began its shift. All three Red Army contingents have abandoned their old positions and moved to new regions. These great shifts have turned the old areas into guerrilla zones. The Red Army has been considerably weakened in the process. From this aspect of the over-all situation, we can see that the enemy has won a temporary and partial victory, while we have suffered a temporary and partial defeat. Is this statement correct? I think it is. For it is a statement of fact. However, some people (Chang Kuo-tao  for instance) say that the Central Red Army  has failed. Is that correct? No. For it is not a statement of fact. In approaching a problem a Marxist should see the whole as well as the parts. A frog in a well says, “The sky is no bigger than the mouth of the well.” That is untrue, for the sky is not just the size of the mouth of the well. If it said, “A part of the sky is the size of the mouth of a well”, that would be true, for it tallies with the facts. What we say is that in one respect the Red Army has failed (i.e., failed to maintain its original positions), but in another respect it has won a victory (i.e., in executing the plan of the Long March). In one respect the enemy won a victory (i.e., in occupying our original positions), but in another respect he has failed (i.e., failed to execute his plan of “encirclement and suppression” and of “pursuit and suppression”). That is the only appropriate formulation, for we have completed the Long March.
Speaking of the Long March, one may ask, “What is its significance?” We answer that the Long March is the first of its kind in the annals of history, that it is a manifesto, a propaganda force, a seeding-machine. Since Pan Ku divided the heavens from the earth and the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors  reigned, has history ever witnessed a long march such as ours? For twelve months we were under daily reconnaissance and bombing from the skies by scores of planes, while on land we were encircled and pursued, obstructed and intercepted by a huge force of several hundred thousand men, and we encountered untold difficulties and dangers on the way; yet by using our two legs we swept across a distance of more than twenty thousand li through the length and breadth of eleven provinces. Let us ask, has history ever known a long march to equal ours? No, never. The Long March is a manifesto. It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes, while the imperialists and their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, obstruct and intercept us. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road of the Red Army is their only road to liberation. Without the Long March, how could the broad masses have learned so quickly about the existence of the great truth which the Red Army embodies? The Long March is also a seeding-machine. In the eleven provinces it has sown many seeds which will sprout, leaf, blossom, and bear fruit, and will yield a harvest in the future. In a word, the Long March has ended with victory for us and defeat for the enemy. Who brought the Long March to victory? The Communist Party. Without the Communist Party, a long march of this kind would have been inconceivable. The Chinese Communist Party, its leadership, its cadres and its members fear no difficulties or hardships. Whoever questions our ability to lead the revolutionary war will fall into the morass of opportunism. A new situation arose as soon as the Long March was over. In the battle of Chihlochen the Central Red Army and the Northwestern Red Army, fighting in fraternal solidarity, shattered the traitor Chiang Kai-shek’s campaign of “encirclement and suppression” against the Shensi-Kansu border area  and thus laid the cornerstone for the task undertaken by the Central Committee of the Party, the task of setting up the national headquarters of the revolution in northwestern China.
This being the situation with regard to the main body of the Red Army, what about the guerrilla warfare in the southern provinces? Our guerrilla forces there have suffered some setbacks but have not been wiped out. In many places, they are reasserting themselves, growing and expanding.
In the Kuomintang areas, the workers’ struggle is now moving beyond the factory walls, and from being an economic struggle is becoming a political struggle. A heroic working-class struggle against the Japanese and the traitors is now in intense ferment and, judging by the situation, it will erupt before long.
The peasants’ struggle has never ceased. Harassed by aggression from abroad, by difficulties at home and by natural disasters, the peasants have unleashed widespread struggles in the form of guerrilla warfare, mass uprisings and famine riots. The anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare now going on in the northeastern provinces and eastern Hopei  is their reply to the attacks of Japanese imperialism.
The student movement has already grown considerably and will certainly go on doing so. But this movement can sustain itself and break through the martial law imposed by the traitors and the policy of disruption and massacre practised by the police, the secret service agents, the scoundrels in the educational world and the fascists only if it is co-ordinated with the struggles of the workers, peasants and soldiers.
We have already dealt with the vacillation of the national bourgeoisie, the rich peasants and small landlords and the possibility that they may actually participate in the anti-Japanese struggle.
The minority nationalities, and especially the people of Inner Mongolia who are directly menaced by Japanese imperialism, are now rising up in struggle. As time goes on, their struggle will merge with that of the people in northern China and with the operations of the Red Army in the Northwest.
All this indicates that the revolutionary situation is now changing from a localized into a nation-wide one and that it is gradually changing from a state of unevenness to a certain degree of evenness. We are on the eve of a great change. The task of the Party is to form a revolutionary national united front by combining the activities of the Red Army with all the activities of the workers, the peasants, the students, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie throughout the country.
THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT
Having surveyed the situation with regard to both the counterrevolution and the revolution, we shall find it easy to define the Party’s tactical tasks.
What is the basic tactical task of the Party? It is none other than to form a broad revolutionary national united front.
When the revolutionary situation changes, revolutionary tactics and methods of leadership must change accordingly. The task of the Japanese imperialists, the collaborators and the traitors is to turn China into a colony, while our task is to turn China into a free and independent country with full territorial integrity.
To win independence and freedom for China is a great task. It demands that we fight against foreign imperialism and the domestic counter-revolutionary forces. Japanese imperialism is determined to bludgeon its way deep into China. As yet the domestic counter-revolutionary forces of the big landlord and comprador classes are stronger than the people’s revolutionary forces. The overthrow of Japanese imperialism and the counter-revolutionary forces in China cannot be accomplished in a day, and we must be prepared to devote a long time to it; it cannot be accomplished by small forces, and we must therefore accumulate great forces. In China, as in the world as a whole, the counter-revolutionary forces are weaker than before and the revolutionary forces stronger. This estimate is correct, representing one aspect of the matter. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the counter-revolutionary forces in China and in the world as a whole are stronger than the revolutionary forces for the time being. This estimate is also correct, representing another aspect of the matter. The uneven political and economic development of China gives rise to the uneven development of her revolution. As a rule, revolution starts, grows and triumphs first in those places in which the counterrevolutionary forces are comparatively weak, while it has yet to start or grows very slowly in those places in which they are strong. Such has long been the situation for the Chinese revolution. It can be predicted that the general revolutionary situation will grow further at certain stages in the future but that the unevenness will remain. The transformation of this unevenness into a general evenness will require a very long time, very great efforts, and the Party’s application of a correct line. Seeing that the revolutionary war led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  took three years to conclude, we must be prepared to devote to the already protracted revolutionary war led by the Chinese Communist Party the longer time necessary to dispose of the domestic and foreign counter-revolutionary forces finally and thoroughly. The kind of impatience that was formerly displayed will never do. Moreover, sound revolutionary tactics must be worked out; we will never achieve great things if we keep on milling around within narrow confines. This does not mean that in China things have to be done slowly; no, they must be done boldly, because the danger of national subjugation does not allow us to slacken for a moment. From now on the revolution will certainly develop much faster than before, for both China and the world are approaching a new period of war and revolution. For all that, China’s revolutionary war will remain a protracted one; this follows from the strength-of imperialism and the uneven development of the revolution. We say that the present situation is one in which a new high tide in the national revolution is imminent and in which China is on the eve of a great new nation-wide revolution; this is one characteristic of the present revolutionary situation. This is a fact, and it represents one aspect of the matter. But we must also say that imperialism is still a force to be earnestly reckoned with, that the unevenness in the development of the revolutionary forces is a serious weakness, and that to defeat our enemies we must be prepared to fight a protracted war; this is another characteristic of the present revolutionary situation. This, too, is a fact, and represents another aspect of the matter. Both characteristics, both facts, teach and urge us to revise our tactics and change our ways of disposing our forces and carrying on the struggle to suit the situation. The present situation demands that we boldly discard all closed-doorism, form a broad united front and guard against adventurism. We must not plunge into decisive battles until the time is ripe and unless we have the necessary strength.
Here I shall not discuss the relation of adventurism to closed-doorism, or the possible dangers of adventurism as events unfold on a larger scale; that can be left for later. For the moment I shall confine myself to explaining that united front tactics and closed-door tactics are diametrically opposed.
The former requires the recruiting of large forces for the purpose of surrounding and annihilating the enemy.
The latter means fighting single-handed in desperate combat against a formidable enemy.
The advocates of united front tactics say, if we are to make a proper estimate of the possibility of forming a broad revolutionary national united front, a proper estimate must be made of the changes that may occur in the alignment of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces in China resulting from the attempt of Japanese imperialism to turn China into a colony. Without a proper estimate of the strong and weak points of the Japanese and Chinese counter-revolutionary forces and of the Chinese revolutionary forces, we shall be unable fully to understand the necessity of organizing a broad revolutionary national united front, or to take firm measures to break down closed-doorism, or to use the united front as a means of organizing and rallying millions of people and all the armies that are potentially friendly to the revolution for the purpose of advancing to strike at our main target, namely, Japanese imperialism and its running dogs, the Chinese traitors, or to use this tactical weapon of ours to strike at the main target before us, but instead we shall aim at a variety of targets so that our bullets will hit not the principal enemy but our lesser enemies or even our allies. This would mean failure to single out the principal enemy and waste of ammunition. It would mean inability to close in and isolate him. It would mean inability to draw to our side all those in the enemy camp and on the enemy front who have joined them under compulsion, and those who were our enemies yesterday but may become our friends today. It would in fact mean helping the enemy, holding back, isolating and constricting the revolution, and bringing it to a low ebb and even to defeat.
The advocates of closed-door tactics say the above arguments are all wrong. The forces of the revolution must be pure, absolutely pure, and the road of the revolution must be straight, absolutely straight. Nothing is correct except what is literally recorded in Holy Writ. The national bourgeoisie is entirely and eternally counter-revolutionary. Not an inch must be conceded to the rich peasants. The yellow trade unions must be fought tooth and nail. If we shake hands with Tsai Ting-kai, we must call him a counter-revolutionary at the same moment. Was there ever a cat that did not love fish or a warlord who was not a counter-revolutionary? Intellectuals are three-day revolutionaries whom it is dangerous to recruit. It follows therefore that closed-doorism is the sole wonder-working magic, while the united front is an opportunist tactic.
Comrades, which is right, the united front or closed-doorism? Which indeed is approved by Marxism-Leninism? I answer without the slightest hesitation–the united front and not closed-doorism. Three-year-olds have many ideas which are right, but they cannot be entrusted with serious national or world affairs because they do not understand them yet. Marxism-Leninism is opposed to the “infantile disorder” found in the revolutionary ranks. This infantile disorder is just what the confirmed exponents of closed-doorism advocate. Like every other activity in the world, revolution always follows a tortuous road and never a straight one. The alignment of forces in the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary camps can change, just as everything else in the world changes. The Party’s new tactics of a broad united front start from the two fundamental facts that Japanese imperialism is bent on reducing all China to a colony and that China’s revolutionary forces still have serious weaknesses. In order to attack the forces of the counter-revolution, what the revolutionary forces need today is to organize millions upon millions of the masses and move a mighty revolutionary army into action. The plain truth is that only a force of such magnitude can crush the Japanese imperialists and the traitors and collaborators. Therefore, united front tactics are the only Marxist-Leninist tactics. The tactics of closed-doorism are, on the contrary, the tactics of the regal isolationist. Closed-doorism just “drives the fish into deep waters and the sparrows into the thickets”, and it will drive the millions upon millions of the masses, this mighty army, over to the enemy’s side, which will certainly win his acclaim. In practice, closed-doorism is the faithful servant of the Japanese imperialists and the traitors and collaborators. Its adherents’ talk of the “pure” and the “straight” will be condemned by Marxist-Leninists and commended by the Japanese imperialists. We definitely want no closed-doorism; what we want is the revolutionary national united front, which will spell death to the Japanese imperialists and the traitors and collaborators.
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
If our government has hitherto been based on the alliance of the workers, the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, from now on it must be so transformed as to include also the members of all other classes who are willing to take part in the national revolution.
At the present time, the basic task of such a government should be to oppose the annexation of China by Japanese imperialism. It will have a broader representation so that it may include those who are interested only in the national revolution and not in the agrarian revolution, and even, if they so desire, those who may oppose Japanese imperialism and its running dogs, though they are not opposed to the European and U.S. imperialists because of their close ties with the latter. Therefore, as a matter of principle, the programme of such a government should be in keeping with the basic task of fighting Japanese imperialism and its lackeys, and we should modify our past policies accordingly.
The special feature on the revolutionary side at present is the existence of a well-steeled Communist Party and Red Army. This is of crucial importance. Great difficulties would arise if they did not exist. Why? Because the traitors and collaborators in China are numerous and powerful and are sure to devise every possible means to wreck the united front; they will sow dissension by means of intimidation and bribery and by maneuvering among various groupings, and will employ their armies to oppress and crush, one by one, all those weaker than themselves who want to part company with them and join us in fighting Japan. All this would hardly be avoidable if the anti-Japanese government and army were to lack this vital factor, i.e., the Communist Party and the Red Army. The revolution failed in 1927 chiefly because, with the opportunist line then prevailing in the Communist Party, no effort was made to expand our own ranks (the workers’ and peasants’ movement and the armed forces led by the Communist Party), and exclusive reliance was placed on a temporary ally, the Kuomintang. The result was that when imperialism ordered its lackeys, the landlord and comprador classes, to spread their numerous tentacles and draw over first Chiang Kai-shek and then Wang Ching-wei, the revolution suffered defeat. In those days the revolutionary united front had no mainstay, no strong revolutionary armed forces, and so when the defections came thick and fast, the Communist Party was forced to fight single-handed and was powerless to foil the tactics of crushing their opponents one by one which were adopted by the imperialists and the Chinese counter-revolutionaries. True, we had the troops under Ho Lung and Yeh Ting, but they were not yet politically consolidated, and the Party was not very skilled in leading them, so that they were finally defeated. The lesson we paid for with our blood was that the lack of a hard core of revolutionary forces brings the revolution to defeat. Today things are quite different. Now we have a strong Communist Party and a strong Red Army, and we also have the base areas of the Red Army. Not only are the Communist Party and the Red Army serving as the initiator of a national united front against Japan today, but in the future too they will inevitably become the powerful mainstay of China’s anti-Japanese government and army, capable of preventing the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek from carrying through their policy of disrupting this united front. However, we must be very vigilant because the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek will undoubtedly resort to every possible form of intimidation and bribery and of manoeuvering among the various groupings.
Naturally we cannot expect every section of the broad national united front against Japan to be as firm as the Communist Party and the Red Army. In the course of their activities some bad elements may withdraw from the united front under the influence of the enemy. However, we need not fear the loss of such people. While bad elements may drop out under the enemy’s influence, good people will come in under ours. The national united front will live and grow as long as the Communist Party and the Red Army live and grow. Such is the leading role of the Communist Party and the Red Army in the national united front. The Communists are no longer political infants and are able to take care of themselves and to handle relations with their allies. If the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek can manoeuvre in relation to the revolutionary forces, the Communist Party can do the same in relation to the counter-revolutionary forces. If they can draw bad elements in our ranks over to their side, we can equally well draw their “bad elements” (good ones from our point of view) over to our side. If we can draw a larger number over to our side, this will deplete the enemy’s ranks and strengthen ours. In short, two basic forces are now locked in struggle, and in the nature of things all the forces in between will have to line up on one side or the other. The Japanese imperialists’ policy of subjugating China and Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of betraying China will inevitably drive many people over to our side–either directly into joining the ranks of the Communist Party and the Red Army or into forming a united front with us. This will come about unless we pursue closed door tactics.
Why change the “workers’ and peasants’ republic” into a “people’s republic”?
Our government represents not only the workers and peasants but the whole nation. This has been implicit in our slogan of a workers’ and peasants’ democratic republic, because the workers and peasants; constitute 80 to go per cent of the population. The Ten-Point Programme  adopted by the Sixth National Congress of our Party embodies the interests of the whole nation and not of the workers and peasants alone. But the present situation requires us to change our slogan, to change it into one of a people’s republic. The reason is that Japanese invasion has altered class relations in China, and it is now possible not only for the petty bourgeoisie but even for the national bourgeoisie to join the anti-Japanese struggle.
The people’s republic will definitely not represent the interests of the enemy classes. On the contrary, it will stand in direct opposition to the landlord and comprador classes, the lackeys of imperialism,. and will not count them among the people. In the same way, Chiang Kai-shek’s “National Government of the Republic of China” represents only the wealthiest, but not the common people whom it does not count as part of the nation. As 80 to 90 per cent of China’s population is made up of workers and peasants, the people’s republic ought to represent their interests first and foremost. However, by throwing off imperialist oppression to make China free and independent and by throwing off landlord oppression to free China from semi-feudalism, the people’s republic will benefit not only the workers and peasants but other sections of the people too. The sum total of the interests of the workers, peasants and the rest of the people constitutes the interests of the whole Chinese nation. The comprador and the landlord classes also live on Chinese soil, but as they have no regard for the national interests, their interests clash with those of the majority. This small minority are the only ones that we break with and are clashing with, and we therefore have the right to call ourselves the representatives of the whole nation.
There is, of course, a dash of interests between the working class and the national bourgeoisie. We shall not be able to extend the national revolution successfully unless the working class, the vanguard of the national revolution, is accorded political and economic rights and is enabled to direct its strength against imperialism and its running dogs, the traitors. However if the national bourgeoisie joins the anti-imperialist united front, the working class and the national bourgeoisie will have interests in common. In the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the people’s republic will not expropriate private property other than imperialist and feudal private property, and so far from confiscating the national bourgeoisie’s industrial and commercial enterprises, it will encourage their development. We shall protect every national capitalist who does not support the imperialists or the Chinese traitors. In the stage of democratic revolution there are limits to the struggle between labour and capital. The labour laws of the people’s republic will protect the interests of the workers, but will not prevent the national bourgeoisie from making profits or developing their industrial and commercial enterprises, because such development is bad for imperialism and good for the Chinese people. Thus it is clear that the people’s republic will represent the interests of all strata opposed to imperialism and the feudal forces. The government of the people’s republic will be based primarily on the workers and peasants, but will also include representatives of the other classes which are opposed to imperialism and the feudal forces.
But is it not dangerous to let the representatives of such classes join the government of the people’s republic? No. The workers and peasants are the basic masses of the republic. In giving the urban petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and other sections of the population who support the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal programme the right to have a voice in the government of the people’s republic and to work in it, the right to vote and stand for election, we must not allow the interests of the workers and peasants, the basic masses, to be violated. The essential part of our programme must be the protection of their interests. With their representatives comprising the majority in this government and with the Communist Party exercising leadership and working within it, there is a guarantee that the participation of other classes will present no danger. It is perfectly obvious that the Chinese revolution at the present stage is still a bourgeois-democratic and not a proletarian socialist revolution in nature. Only the counter-revolutionary Trotskyites  talk such nonsense as that China has already completed her bourgeois-democratic revolution and that any further revolution can only be socialist. The revolution of 1924-27 was a bourgeois-democratic revolution, which was not carried to completion but failed. The agrarian revolution which we have led since 1927 is also a bourgeois-democratic revolution, because it is directed not against capitalism, but against imperialism and feudalism. This will remain true of our revolution for quite a long time to come.
Basically, the workers, the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie arc still the motive forces of the revolution, but now there may be the national bourgeoisie as well.
The change in the revolution will come later. In the future the democratic revolution will inevitably be transformed into a socialist revolution. As to when the transition will take place, that will depend on the presence of the necessary conditions, and it may take quite a long time. We should not hold forth about transition until all the necessary political and economic conditions are present and until it is advantageous and not detrimental to the overwhelming majority of the people throughout China. It is wrong to have any doubts on this matter and expect the transition to take place soon, as some of our comrades did when they maintained that the transition in the revolution would begin the moment the democratic revolution began to triumph in key provinces. They did so because they failed to understand what kind of country China is politically and economically and to realize that, compared with Russia, China will find it more difficult, and require much more time and effort, to complete her democratic revolution politically and economically.
Finally, a word is necessary about the relation between the Chinese and the world revolution.
Ever since the monster of imperialism came into being, the affairs of the world have become so closely interwoven that it is impossible to separate them. We Chinese have the spirit to fight the enemy to the last drop of our blood, the determination to recover our lost territory by our own efforts, and the ability to stand on our own feet in the family of nations. But this does not mean that we can dispense with international support; no, today international support is necessary for the revolutionary struggle of any nation or country. There is the old adage, “In the Spring and Autumn Era there were no righteous wars.” This is even truer of imperialism today, for it is only the oppressed nations and the oppressed classes that can wage just wars. All wars anywhere in the world in which the people rise up to fight their oppressors are just struggles. The February and October Revolutions in Russia were just wars. The revolutions of the people in various European countries after World War I were just struggles. In China, the Anti-Opium War, the War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Yi Ho Tuan War, the Revolutionary War of 1911, the Northern Expedition of 1926-27, the Agrarian Revolutionary War from 1927 to the present, and the present resistance to Japan and punitive actions against traitors–these are all just wars. Now, in the mounting tide of nation-wide struggle against Japan and of world-wide struggle against fascism, just wars will spread all over China and the globe. All just wars support each other, while all unjust wars should be turned into just wars–this is the Leninist line. Our war against Japan needs the support of the people of the whole world and, above all, the support of the people of the Soviet Union, which they will certainly give us because they and we are bound together in a common cause. In the past, the Chinese revolutionary forces were temporarily cut off from the world revolutionary forces by Chiang Kai-shek, and in this sense we were isolated. Now the situation has changed, and changed to our advantage. Henceforth it will continue to change to our advantage. We can no longer be isolated. This provides a necessary condition for China’s victory in the war against Japan and for victory in the Chinese revolution.
1. The Twenty-one Demands on the Yuan Shih-kai government were presented by the Japanese imperialists on January 18. 1915. On May 7, they sent an ultimatum demanding a reply within forty-eight hours. The demands were divided into five parts. The first four contained the following: to transfer to Japan the rights Germany had seized in Shantung and to grant Japan additional rights in the province; to grant rights to the Japanese to lease or own land in southern Manchuria and eastern Mongolia and to establish residence, engage in industry and commerce, and have exclusive railway building and mining rights there; to reorganize the Han-Yeh-Ping Iron and Steel Company as a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise; and to undertake not to lease or cede any harbours or islands along China’s coastline to any third power. The fifth part contained demands that Japan should control China’s political, financial, military and police affairs and should build vital railway lines connecting the provinces of Hupeh, Kiangsi and Kwangtung. Yuan Shih-kai accepted all the demands except those in the fifth part, about which he pleaded for “further negotiations”. Thanks to the unanimous opposition of the Chinese people, Japan failed to get her demands implemented.
2. Yuan Shih-kai was the head of the Northern warlords in the last years of the Ching Dynasty. After the Ching Dynasty was overthrown by the Revolution of 1911, he usurped the presidency of the Republic and organized the first government of the Northern warlords, which represented the big landlord and big comprador classes. He did this by relying on counter-revolutionary armed force and on the support of the imperialists and by taking advantage of the conciliationist nature of the bourgeoisie then leading the revolution. In 1915 he wanted to make himself emperor and, to gain the support of the Japanese imperialists, accepted the Twenty-one Demands with which Japan aimed at obtaining exclusive control of all China. In December of the same year an uprising against his assumption of the throne took place in Yunnan Province and promptly won country-wide response and support. Yuan Shih-kai died in Peking in June 1916.
3. The Nine-Power Conference in Washington was called by the U.S. government in November 1921; China, Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Japan were invited. It was a struggle between the United States and Japan for hegemony in the Far East. On February 6, 1922, a nine-power treaty was concluded on the basis of the principle, advanced by the United States, of the “open door” or “equal opportunities for all nations in China”. The aim of this treaty was to create a situation in which the imperialist powers had joint control of China, and it actually cleared the way for exclusive domination by the U.S. imperialists, the purpose being to frustrate Japan’s plans for exclusive domination.
4. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese “Kwantung Army” in northeastern China seized Shenyang. Under Chiang Kai-shek’s order of “absolute non-resistance”, the Chinese troops at Shenyang and elsewhere in the Northeast (the Northeastern Army) withdrew to the south of Shanhaikuan, and consequently the Japanese forces rapidly occupied the provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang. This act of Japanese aggression has become known as the “September 18th Incident”.
5. The “four northeastern provinces” were then Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol, which correspond to the present Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang Provinces, the northeastern part of Hopei Province north of the Great Wall and the eastern part of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. After the September 18th Incident, the Japanese invaders occupied Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang and later, in 1933, seized Jehol.
6. At the instigation of the Japanese, a puppet regime called the “Eastern Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Administration” was established in twenty-two counties in eastern Hopei by the Kuomintang traitor Yin Ju-keng on November 25, 1935. This became known as the Eastern Hopei Incident.
7. The diplomatic talks between the Chiang Kai-shek government and the Japanese government discussed the so called “Three Principles of Hirota”, i.e., the “Three Principles for Dealing with China” put forward by Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota, namely, (1) suppression by China of all anti-Japanese movements; (2) establishment of economic co-operation between China, Japan and “Manchukuo”; and (3) joint defence by China and Japan against communism. On January 21, 1936, Hirota told the Diet that the Chinese government “has accepted the three principles proposed by the Empire”.
8. The year 1935 witnessed a new upsurge in the popular patriotic movement throughout the country. Students in Peking, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, held a patriotic demonstration on December 9, putting forward such slogans as “Stop the civil war and unite to resist foreign aggression” and “Down with Japanese imperialism”. This movement broke through the long reign of terror imposed by the Kuomintang government in league with the Japanese invaders and very quickly won the people’s support throughout the country. It is known as the “December 8th Movement”. The outcome was that new changes manifested themselves in the relations among the various classes in the country, and the Anti-Japanese National United Front proposed by the Communist Party of China became the openly advocated policy of all patriotic people. The Chiang Kai-shek government with its traitorous policy became very isolated.
9. At the time of this report Chiang Kai-shek, after selling out the Northeast to Japan, was selling out northern China while actively keeping up his fighting against the Red Army. Therefore the Chinese Communist Party had to do its best to expose him as a traitor, and naturally he was not included in the Anti-Japanese National United Front proposed by the Party. But already in this report Comrade Mao Tse-tung mentioned the possible disintegration of the camp of the Chinese landlord and comprador classes as a result of the contradictions among the imperialist powers. And Japan’s attack on northern China did subsequently lead to serious dashes of interest between Japanese and Anglo-American imperialism. The Chinese Communist Party maintained that the Chiang Kai-shek clique, with its close ties with Anglo- American imperialist interests, might change its attitude to Japan at its masters’ bidding, and therefore it adopted the policy of compelling Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan. On its return to northern Shensi from Shansi, in May 1936 the Red Army appealed directly to the Nanking Kuomintang government for an end to the civil war and for united resistance to Japan. In August of the same year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party addressed a letter to the Kuomintang’s Central Executive Committee, calling for the formation of a bi-partisan united front against Japan and negotiations between the representatives of both parties. But Chiang Kai-shek rejected these proposals. It was not until December 1936 when Chiang Kai-shek was detained in Sian by Kuomintang army officers who favoured alliance with the Communists against Japan that he was compelled to accept the Communist Party’s demand for ending the civil war and resisting Japan.
10. Tsai Ting-kai was deputy commander of the Kuomintang’s 19th Route Army and commander of one of its corps, the two other leaders being Chen Ming-shu and Chiang Kuang-nai. This army, which had fought the Red Army in Kiangsi, was transferred to Shanghai after the September 18th Incident. The mounting anti-Japanese tide of the people in Shanghai and the whole country had a great impact on the 19th Route Army. When the Japanese marines attacked in Shanghai during the night of January 28, 1932, the Army and the people of Shanghai put up a joint resistance. However, the battle was lost through the treachery of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei. Later, on Chiang’s orders, the 19th Route Army was transferred to Fukien to fight the Red Army again. But the leaders of the Army gradually came to realize the futility of such fighting. In November 1933, allying themselves with Kuomintang forces under Li Chi-shen and others, they publicly renounced Chiang Kai-shek, established the “People’s Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China” in Fukien, and concluded an agreement with the Red Army to resist Japan and oppose Chiang Kai-shek. The 19th Route Army and Fukien People’s Government collapsed under the attacks of Chiang’s troops. From then on, Tsai Ting-kai and others gradually moved towards a position of co-operation with the Communist Party.
11. Peng Yu-hsiang, together with the forces under his command in Suiyuan Province, announced his break with the Northern warlord clique and joined the revolution when the revolutionary Northern Expeditionary Army reached Wuhan in September 1926. Early in 1927, his troops moved in from Shensi to attack Honan Province in co-ordination with the Northern Expeditionary Army. Although Feng participated in anti-Communist activities following the betrayal of the revolution by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei in 1927, there was always a clash of interests between him and the Chiang Kai-shek clique. After Japan invaded China on September 18, 1931 he favoured resistance and in May 1933 co-operated with the Communist Party in forming the people’s Anti-Japanese Allied Army in Changchiakou. His efforts came to naught in August under the pressure of both Chiang Kai-shek’s forces and the Japanese invaders. In his later years Feng continued to co-operate with the Communist Party.
12. An uprising took place at Ningtu, Kiangsi in December 1931 within the Kuomintang’s 26th Route Army, which was sent by Chiang Kai-shek to attack the Red Army in Kiangsi Province. Led by Comrades Chao Po-sheng and Tung Chen-tang, more than ten thousand officers and men rose up and joined the Red Army in response to the Communist call for resistance to Japan.
13. Ma Chan-shan was an officer of the Kuomintang’s Northeastern Army whose troops were stationed in Heilungkiang. He and his men fought the Japanese invaders who drove towards Heilungkiang via Liaoning after the September 18th Incident.
14. Hu Han-min, a well-known Kuomintang politician, was an opponent of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s policy of co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party and was Chiang Kai-shek’s accomplice in the counter-revolutionary coup d’état of April 12, 1927. Later he fell out with Chiang in a struggle for power and was held in detention by the latter. Set free after the September 18th Incident, he left Nanking for Canton where he instigated the warlords of Kwangtung and Kwangsi to oppose Chiang Kai-shek’s Nanking government for a considerable period of time.
15. The Six-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation was the “Chinese People’s Basic Programme for Fighting Japan” put forward by the Chinese Communist Party in 1934 and published over the signatures of Soong Ching Ling (Mme. Sun Yat-sen) and others. The programme consisted of the following points: (1) mobilize all sea, land and air forces to fight Japan; (2) mobilize the people throughout the country; (3) arm all the people; (4) confiscate the property of the Japanese imperialists in China and of the traitors to defray war expenditure; (5) establish an all-China committee for national armed defence, to be elected by the representatives of workers, peasants, soldiers, students and businessmen; and (6) form an alliance with all the forces opposed to the Japanese imperialists, and establish friendly relations with all countries observing benevolent neutrality.
18. Comrade Jen Pi-shih was a veteran member of the Chinese Communist Party and one of its first organizers. He was a member of the Party’s Central Committee from its Fifth National Congress in 1927 onwards. He was elected to the Political Bureau at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in 1931. In 1933 he served as secretary of the Provincial Party Committee of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area and concurrently as political commissar of the Sixth Army Group of the Red Army. When the Sixth and Second Army Groups joined forces and formed the Second Front Army, he was appointed its political commissar. He was Director of the General Political Department of the Eighth Route Army in the first years of the War of Resistance. In 1940 he began to serve in the Secretariat of the Party’s Central Committee. At the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee in 1945 he was again elected a member of the Political Bureau and of the Secretariat. Comrade Jen Pi-shih died in Peking on October 27, 1950.
19. The Sixth Army Group of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, originally stationed in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, broke through the enemy’s siege and shifted its position in August 1934 on the orders of the Party’s Central Committee. In October it joined forces with the Second Army Group led by Comrade Ho Lung in eastern Kweichow, and together they formed the Second Front Army of the Red Army and created the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow revolutionary base area.
20. In October 1934 the First Third and Fifth Army Groups of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (that is, the First Front Army of the Red Army, also known as the Central Red Army) set out from Changting and Ninghua in western Fukien and from Juichin, Yutu and other places in southern Kiangsi and started a major strategic movement. In traversing the eleven provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan, Yunnan, Sikang, Kansu and Shensi, crossing perpetually snow-capped mountains and trackless grasslands, sustaining untold hardships and frustrating the enemy’s repeated encirclements, pursuits, obstructions and interceptions, the Red Army covered 25,000 li (12,500 kilometres) on this march and finally arrived triumphantly at the revolutionary base area in northern Shensi in October 1935.
21. The Red Army in the Szechuan-Shensi border area was the Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. In March 1935, it shifted from its base in the Szechuan-Shensi border area to the borders of Szechuan and Sikang Provinces. In June, it joined forces with the First Front Army in Maokung in western Szechuan and advanced northward by two routes, a right route and a left route. But on arriving in the Maoerhkai area near Sungpan in September, Chang Kuo-tao of the Fourth Front Army led the troops on the left route in a southward direction, in defiance of the Central Committee’s orders, thus causing a disruption in the Red Army. The Second Front Army, which had broken through the enemy’s siege and left the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow border area, arrived at Kantze, Sikang Province, in June 1936 via Hunan, Kweichow and Yunnan, and there it joined forces with the Fourth Front Army. Acting against Chang Kuo-tao’s wishes, the comrades in the Fourth Front Army resumed the shift northward together with the Second Front Army. In October, the entire Second Front Army and a part of the Fourth Front Army arrived in northern Shensi and succeeded in joining forces with the First Front Army.
22. Chang Kuo-tao was a renegade from the Chinese revolution. Speculating on the revolution, he joined the Chinese Communist Party in his youth. In the Party he made many mistakes and ended by committing grave crimes. Most notoriously, in 1935 he opposed the Red Army’s northward march, advocating a defeatist and liquidationist withdrawal by the Red Army to the minority-nationality areas on the Szechuan-Sikang border, and he engaged in openly traitorous activities against the Party and the Central Committee, established his own bogus central committee, disrupted the unity of the Party and the Red Army, and caused heavy losses to its Fourth Front Army. Thanks to patient education by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee, the Fourth Front Army and its numerous cadres soon came back under the correct leadership of the Central Committee and played an honourable part in subsequent struggles. Chang Kuo-tao, however, proved incorrigible, escaped by himself from the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region in the spring of 1938 and joined the Kuomintang secret police.
23. The Central Red Army, or the First Front Army, refers to the Red Army that was built up in the Kiangsi-Fukien area directly under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
25. In July 1935, the Kuomintang troops started their third “encirclement and suppression” campaign against the Shensi-Kansu revolutionary base area. The 26th Army Corps of the Northern Shensi Red Army routed two enemy brigades in the eastern sector and drove the enemy to the east of the Yellow River. In September, the 25th Army Corps of the Red Army, which had been operating in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei base area, joined forces with the Northern Shensi Red Army after arriving in northern Shensi via southern Shensi and eastern Kansu, and together they formed the 15th Army Group of the Red Army. In the Kanchuan-Laoshan campaign, this army group wiped out most of the enemy 110th Division, killed its divisional commander and in a subsequent action destroyed four battalions of the enemy’s 107th Division at Yulinchiao, Kanchuan County. The enemy organized new attacks and put Tung Ying-pin (an army corps commander of the Northeastern Army) in command of five divisions, which mounted an attack along two routes; the division on the east route drove northward by way of Lochuan and Fuhsien and the other four divisions on the west route drove along the Hulu River towards Fuhsien northern Shensi, via Chingyang and Hoshui in Kansu. By October, the Central Red Army reached northern Shensi. In the following month the Central Red Army and the 15th Army Group jointly wiped out the enemy’s 109th Division in Chihlochen, southwest of Fuhsien, and eliminated one regiment of the enemy’s 106th Division at Heishuisze in the course of pursuit. Thus the enemy’s third “encirclement and suppression” campaign against the Shensi-Kansu border area was completely smashed.
26. When the main forces of the Red Army in southern China shifted position during 1934-35, they left behind some units to operate as guerrillas. These guerrilla units held out in the following fourteen base areas in eight provinces: southern Chekiang, northern Fukien, eastern Fukien, southern Fukien, western Fukien, northeastern Kiangsi, the Fukien-Kiangsi border, the Kwangtung-Kiangsi border, southern Hunan, the Hunan-Kiangsi border, the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border, the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border, the Tungpai Mountains in southern Honan and Hainan Island off the coast of Kwangtung.
27. After the Japanese imperialists occupied the Northeast in 1931, the Chinese Communist Party called upon the people to put up armed resistance. It organized anti-Japanese guerrilla units, formed the Northeastern People’s Revolutionary Army and rendered assistance to various volunteer forces fighting the enemy. In 1934, under the leadership of the Party, all these forces were reorganized into the single Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, with the outstanding Communist Yang Ching-yu as Commander-in-Chief. This army kept up anti-Japanese guerrilla war in the Northeast for a long time. The anti-Japanese guerrilla war in eastern Hopei refers to the peasant uprising against Japan there in May 1935.
28. The revolutionary war led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union refers to the fighting from 1918 to 1920 in which the Soviet people beat off armed intervention by Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Poland, etc., and suppressed the White Guard rebellion.
29. The political power and the policies of a people’s republic, as here enunciated by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, were made a reality in the people’s Liberated Areas under the leadership of the Communist Party during the War of Resistance. That was why the Party was able to lead the people behind the enemy lines in waging a victorious war against the Japanese invaders. After Japan’s surrender, the Third Revolutionary Civil War broke out. As the war went on, the area liberated by the people gradually extended to the whole of China, and in this way the unified People’s Republic of China was born. Thus Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s ideal of a people’s republic was eventually realized throughout the country.
30. The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in July 1928 adopted the following Ten-Point Programme: (1) overthrow imperialist rule; (2) confiscate foreign capitalist enterprises and banks; (3) unify China and recognize the right of the nationalities to self-determination; (4) overthrow the Kuomintang warlord government; (5) establish a government of councils of workers, peasants and soldiers; (6) institute the eight-hour day, increase wages, and establish unemployment relief and social insurance, (7) confiscate the land of all landlords and distribute the land among the peasants. (8) improve the living conditions of the soldiers, give land and jobs to ex-soldiers; (9) abolish all exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies and adopt a consolidated progressive tax; and (10) unite with the world proletariat, unite with the Soviet Union.
31. Originally an anti-Leninist faction in the Russian working-class movement, the Trotskyite group later degenerated into a downright counter-revolutionary gang. In his report to the plenary session of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.) in 1937, Comrade Stalin explained the course this group of renegades had run as follows:
In the past, seven or eight years ago, Trotskyism was one of such political trends in the working class, an anti-Leninist trend, it is true, and therefore profoundly mistaken, but nevertheless a political trend…. Present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend in the working class, but a gang without principle and without ideas, of wreckers and diversionists, intelligence service agents, spies, murderers, a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, working in the pay of the intelligence services of foreign states.
After the failure of the Chinese revolution in 1927, a small number of Trotskyites appeared in China, too. Ganging up with Chen Tu-hsiu and other renegades, they formed a small counter-revolutionary clique in 1929 and spread such counterrevolutionary propaganda as that the Kuomintang had already completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and they became a dirty imperialist and Kuomintang instrument against the people. The Chinese Trotskyites shamelessly joined the Kuomintang secret service. After the September 18th Incident, to fulfil the order given by the criminal renegade Trotsky “not to impede the occupation of China by imperial Japan”, they began collaborating with Japanese secret agents, received subsidies from them and engaged in all kinds of activities facilitating Japanese aggression.
32. This quotation is from Mencius. Mencius made this remark because in the period known as the Spring and Autumn Era (722-481 B.C.) the feudal princes of China incessantly fought one another for power.
33. Faced with the opposition of the Chinese people to her traffic in opium, Britain sent forces in 1840-42 to invade Kwangtung and other coastal regions of China, under the pretext of protecting trade. Led by Lin Tse-hsu, the troops in Kwangtung fought a war of resistance. A “Quell-the-British Corps” which was spontaneously organized by the people of Canton also dealt the British aggressors severe blows.
34. The War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was a peasant revolutionary war in the middle of the 19th century against the feudal rule and national oppression of the Ching Dynasty. In January 1851 Hung Hsiu-chuan, Yang Hsiu-ching and other leaders of this revolution staged an uprising in Chintien Village of Kueiping County in Kwangsi and proclaimed the founding of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. In 1852 the peasant army, proceeding northward from Kwangsi, marched through Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Anhwei and in 1853 captured Nanking, the main city on the lower Yangtse. A part of the forces then continued the drive north and pushed to the vicinity of Tientsin. However, the Taiping army failed to build stable base areas in the places it occupied, and also, after establishing its capital in Nanking, the leading group in the army committed many political and military errors; therefore it could not withstand the combined onslaught of the counter-revolutionary forces of the Ching government and of the British, U.S. and French aggressors, and it was finally defeated in 1864.
35. The Yi Ho Tuan War was the vast spontaneous movement of the peasants and handicraftsmen in northern China in 1900. Forming themselves into mystical secret societies, these peasants and handicraftsmen carried on armed struggle against the imperialists. But the movement was put down with indescribable savagery, and Peking and Tientsin were occupied by the joint forces of eight imperialist powers.
37. See V. I. Lenin, “The War Programme of the Proletarian Revolution”, Collected Works, Russ. ea., Moscow, 1950, Vol. XXIII. See also History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course, Chapter 6, Section 3.